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Where the Right gets in:  
On Rawls’s Criticism of Habermas’s Conception of Legitimacy 
!
Many commentators have failed to identify the important issues at the heart of the debate between 
Habermas and Rawls. This is partly because they give undue attention to differences between their 
respective devices of representation, the original position and principle (U), neither of which are germane 
to the actual dispute. The dispute is at bottom about how best to conceive of democratic legitimacy. Rawls 
indicates where the dividing issues lie when he objects that Habermas’s account of democratic legitimacy 
is comprehensive and his is confined to the political. But his argument is vitiated by a threefold ambiguity 
in what he means by “comprehensive doctrine.” Tidying up this ambiguity helps reveal that the dispute 
turns on the way in which morality relates to political legitimacy. Although Habermas calls his conception 
of legitimate law “morally freestanding”, and as such distinguishes it from Kantian and Natural Law 
accounts of legitimacy, it is not as freestanding from morality as he likes to present it. Habermas’s mature 
theory contains conflicting claims about relation between morality and democratic legitimacy. So there is 
at least one important sense in which Rawls's charge of comprehensiveness is made to stick against 
Habermas’s conception of democratic legitimacy, and remains unanswered.  !
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1.1. In my estimation there has been a lot of unnecessary confusion about where the issues in the 
dispute between Rawls and Habermas lie.  That confusion extends both to the relevant secondary 1
literature, and to the two protagonists themselves in their respective contributions to the debate.  A 2
considerable part of the actual debate, and of its interpretation and analysis by commentators in the 
scholarly literature, was derailed by the assumption that the salient point of comparison between the 
respective political theories of Rawls and Habermas lies in their distinct ways of operationalizing 'the 
moral point of view,’ or in their respective 'devices of representation,’ namely the Original Position and 
Principle (U).  But that is not where the interesting points of the debate lie, and little is to be gained from 3
taking these as the relevant points of contrast. The interesting points of dispute concern their respective 
accounts of the relation between morality and legitimacy, and arbitrating that dispute can throw light on 
what is still a very important question in political and legal theory. 
!
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That the existing literature has been preoccupied, to the neglect of other issues, with the comparison 
between the Original Position and Principle U is beyond question. This is probably because Habermas 
himself kicks off the debate by levying three criticisms at Rawls’s idea of the Original Position. He claims 
i. that the rational egoists in the original position are not able to stand in for, and model, the 
interests of 'autonomous citizens' and understand 'the meaning of the deontological principles they are 
seeking' (RPUR 28); 
ii. that rights 'cannot be a assimilated to primary goods without forfeiting their deontological 
meaning' hence the device of the original position does not represent an adequate procedure for the voice 
of principles of justice (RPUR 29); 
iii.  that Rawls smuggles in substantive considerations to the original position and does not develop 
it in a 'strictly procedural manner.' The theorist must already anticipate some of the information that is 
meant to flow in later steps 'of framing the constitution, of legislation, and applying the law' which defeats 
the point of the veil of ignorance (RPUR).  4
!
1.2. Let me explain why these objections miss the point. To begin with the first two objections show 
that Habermas tends to construe the Theory of Justice as a general moral theory, vying with Kant’s 
deontological ethics and utilitarianism as a general theory of right conduct. This, in fact, is how Lawrence 
Kohlberg reads Theory and Kohlberg’s work on the psychology of moral development exerted a 
significant influence on Habermas as he was developing Discourse Ethics.  Habermas’ talk here of 5
'deontological principles' and 'deontological meaning' indicates that he construes Theory of Justice as a 
general moral theory. And this supposition is confirmed by Habermas’s presenting Rawls’ device of 
choosing principles in the Original Position, behind a veil of ignorance, as a rival conception of the moral 
standpoint to discourse ethics. No doubt Rawls himself was partly responsible for Justice as Fairness’s 
being so interpreted. In his earlier work he was keen to present his view as Kantian, implying that the 
Original Position is the operationalization of the moral point of view, rather like the Formula of the 
Universal Law, and that Justice as Fairness can be interpreted as a general theory of right conducted.
 
As 6
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Rawls later admitted: 'In Theory a moral doctrine of justice general in scope is not distinguished from a 
strictly political conception of justice' (PL, xvii).  7
 Anyway, the later Rawls is keen to dispel the idea that he is advancing a 'moral doctrine of justice 
general in scope' and to reject the view that this is an appropriate task for political philosophy. The phrase  
'moral doctrine of justice general in scope' is an almost perfect description of Habermas’s Discourse 
Ethics, by contrast, which is a moral theory in the sense that it is a theory of right conduct that sets out to 
rationally reconstruct (and to justify) the moral standpoint, which he purports to capture by principle (U). 
Accordingly, in Habermas’s work ‘justice’ is equivalent to moral rightness: it is the central normative 
concept of the discourse theory of morality and the central phenomenon to be studied.  Principle (U), the 8
moral principle, has universal scope, and covers the whole range of interpersonal conflicts of action that 
can be appropriately regulated by appeal to valid moral norms. Unlike Rawls’s two principles of justice 
(U) is not tailored only to questions concerning the basic structure of society.  
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1.3.  Now, thinking of the Original Position and (U) as the central points of contrast of the Habermas-
Rawls debate would make interpretative sense only if the debate was one between Rawls’ s Theory of 
Justice construed – in my view misconstrued – as a doctrine of justice general in scope, and Discourse 
Ethics understood – correctly – as a deontological moral theory. That, however, gets the whole context of 
the debate wrong, and so deflects attention from the real issues.   
This is the proper context. The Habermas-Rawls debate took place in 1995, three years after the 
publication of Faktizität und Geltung and two years after the publication of Political Liberalism.  The 9
former is a theory of democratic legitimacy and the rule of law, and the latter is a defence of justice as a 
political conception.  (The full title of Habermas’s book in English is Between Facts and Norms: 10
Contributions to a Theory of Law and Democracy). The focus of the 1995 exchange is evident from the 
titles of their respective contributions: Habermas’s 'Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: 
Remarks on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism' and Rawls’s 'Political Liberalism: Reply to Habermas.'  
Rawls emphasizes that the theory of Political Liberalism, which the debate was about, falls entirely in the 
domain of the political (RH 47). Habermas, though he has a different conception of the political to Rawls, 
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accepts these terms. All of which is not a knock down argument against those interpreters who construe 
the dispute as one between two moral theories or 'two procedures of moral thinking,' but it does constitute 
significant evidence against it.  
1.4. The second thing to note about Habermas’s opening objections is that by straightway contrasting 
the Original Position with Principle (U), he appears to imply that these contrasting ideas lie at the heart of 
the dispute.  But it should strike one as quite puzzling why Habermas would initiate a discussion of 11
Rawls’ Political Liberalism with criticisms aimed at the Original Position, which is not a central 
component of that theory. I think he does this, because, at the time of writing – as he later makes clear – 
he did not fully appreciate the differences between Political Liberalism and Theory of Justice. (Habermas 
(2011), 284.)  12
  
1.5. Interestingly Rawls, in his Reply to Habermas, describes the difference between their respective 
'devices of representation' by implication as the second and least fundamental difference between them. 
The first, more fundamental difference, he claims – which 'frames the second,' – is that Habermas’s theory 
'is comprehensive while mine is an account of the political and is limited to that' (RH 47). Rawls is right 
not to see the difference between Original Position and principle (U) as fundamental.  As we have seen, 
Habermas’s principle (U) is the central principle of Discourse Ethics. It is not the centrepiece of 
Habermas’s political theory. That honour goes to what he calls the Principle of Democracy, which states: 
Only those statutes may claim legitimacy [legitime Geltung] that can meet with the assent of all 
citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted.   13
Furthermore, it is fundamental to the design of Habermas’s political and legal theory that the ‘principle of 
democracy’ does not depend on, or derive from, the moral principle (U), nor indeed from any moral 
principle, moral theory, or any actually existing morality.  
 The central argument of Between Facts and Norms is that the principle of democracy 'derives 
from the interpenetration of principle (D) and the legal form.'  Principle (D) states that 'only those norms 14
are valid that could meet with the assent of all those potentially affected, insofar as they participate in 
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rational discourse.'  (D) is held to be a rule of practical argumentation in general, i.e. one that applies to 15
all types of practical discourse.  It is supposedly anchored below the threshold of morality (and politics), 16
in the deep structure of social action, and as such expresses a necessary condition of the validity of action-
norms in general – political, legal and moral norms.  It is, Habermas claims, 'neutral' or 'initially 17
indifferent vis à vis morality and law'.  This is what Habermas means when he later claims –with a nod 18
towards Rawls’s Political Liberalism – that the principle of democracy is 'morally freestanding.'  19
 The legal form, for its part, is a matter of institutional and empirical fact. So the structure of 
Habermas’s theory, the relation between the three principles, reflects Habermas’s view that in modern 
societies political legitimacy does not derive from moral norms. The principle of democracy is supposed 
to rationally reconstruct 'the democratic procedure for the production of law' which is the sole source of 
legitimacy in modern Western societies.  In other words, according to Habermas, the normative force 20
(and authority) of law is sui generis; it is not borrowed from the normative force and authority of 
morality. That, he argues, is the mistake that thinkers such as Kant, Natural Law theorists, and K-O Apel 
make.  Rather the normative force of law is borrowed from 'the validity basis of action oriented to 21
reaching understanding.'  This is not just an abstract theoretical point, namely a feature of Habermas’s 22
reconstruction of democratically legitimate law. It is also equally a feature of the actual systems of 
legitimate law that his theory reconstructs.  
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1.6. Rawls’s central idea in Political Liberalism is to formulate and to present a political conception of 
justice, where what makes the conception political is that it is freestanding from any comprehensive 
moral or philosophical doctrine.  Thus, in Political Liberalism Rawls presents and re-construes Justice as 23
Fairness as a 'module, an essential constituent part that fits into and can be supported by various 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines' but that, importantly, is not dependent on any single comprehensive 
doctrine or any particular combination thereof (PL 12). A political conception also has to meet two further 
criteria: scope specificity – it only addresses issues of justice that apply to the basic structure; and 
publicity – it should also derive its content from the fundamental ideas contained in the public political 
culture (PL 11, 450-52). The latter condition is not fully met by the conception’s being part of an 
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'overlapping consensus' of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, not if the overlapping consensus is 
thought of as a serendipitous overlap, say, like the intersection area of a Venn diagram. That may contain 
coincidentally shared preferences, or values whose universality arises, say, from hard wired aspects of 
human nature. (It might not be permissible for a liberal state to legislate on the basis of such preferences 
or values, merely because they are shared by all citizens. For example, it might lead to overly invasive 
and needlessly prescriptive laws.) Which is only to say that not everything in the overlapping consensus 
so conceived will be a political value; although no value that is not part of the overlapping consensus can 
count as a political value.  Rather the values that are political, and meet the publicity condition, will be 
those values that form part of the overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines, that are 'realized in and 
characterize political institutions' , and which 'others, as free and equal citizens, might also be reasonably 
expected reasonably to endorse.' (PL 453 & 450) 
 The salient differences from Theory stem from the fact that the focus in the later work is not on 
justice per se, but on justice as a political conception, which meets the conditions stated above, and is 
thus apt to play a role in the determination of political legitimacy for a democratic constitutional liberal 
state. This is because the chief aim of the later work is to make a case for constitutional liberal democracy, 
i.e. for a régime in which the legitimacy of laws and policies flow from its having a liberal constitution 
and a democratic form of government, rather than for liberalism or democracy as such.  Crucially, both 24
the theory provided by Rawls and the particular form of government it sets out to explain and defend have 
to operate, and to be made acceptable, under conditions of reasonable pluralism, which means that they 
can be welcomed as reasonable by free and equal citizens, whatever their comprehensive doctrine. 
One consequence of his making the theory of Political Liberalism itself (not just the political 
régime it is a theory of) responsive to the fact of reasonable pluralism, is that Rawls has to allow that 
Justice as Fairness is only one among several possible political conceptions of justice (PL 450).  
!
1.7. All this dislodges the Original Position from the central place it occupied in Theory.  In Political 25
Liberalism it is merely one device (among others) for showing that the Principles of Justice may be 
endorsed by free and equal citizens in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human 
!6
reason, and thus that Justice as Fairness is a political conception.  To sum up, just as principle (U) is not 26
a central organizing idea of Between Facts and Norms, so the Original Position is not a central organizing 
idea of Political Liberalism, and consequently discussions of the Habermas-Rawls debate which take this 
as the salient contrast are not engaging the real issues. In spite of what many commentators have 
assumed, the heart of the dispute lies elsewhere.  27
!
*     *     * 
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2.1. I maintain that the Habermas-Rawls debate is in essence a dispute about the nature of legitimacy 
and the production of legitimate law in liberal constitutional democracies.   The central question they 28
both raise is how a democratic liberal state can produce legitimate laws and policies, which, to put it in 
Habermas’s terms can elicit enough quasi-voluntary compliance to law to maintain social integration, or, 
to put it in Rawls’s terms, can evince 'stability for the right reasons' (PL xlii). But to identify the issues 
that divide them we need to examine the different answers they respectively give to this question, paying 
particular attention to areas where one theorist denies something significant that the other affirms. Doing 
so will allow us to zero in on two important and related sets of issues that divide them.  
 The first and I believe most significant is, to put it briefly and much too crudely, the question of 
how the moral stands to the political. In other words, what role does morality (suitably specified) play in 
the determination of legitimate law and policy in a liberal constitutional democracy? The second set of 
issues concerns how the arguments of political philosophy stand in respect to the arguments by the 
representative of the state, or by citizens, for a liberal constitutional democratic régime. In other words 
how do the reasons adduced by the political theorist in support of her theory stand with respect to the 
reasons offered by the state to its citizens, and by citizens to one another, in support of its power to coerce 
them, and of other related matters such as the extent of its reach, the appropriateness of its objects, and the 
nature of its implementation. 
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2.2. These two sets of issues are broached in the second group of criticisms that Habermas makes in 
RPUR, and they gradually come into focus in Rawls’s response to them in RH and in Habermas’s 
subsequent reflection on that response in RTMW. In section 2 of RPUR Habermas makes the following 
three criticisms: that Rawls collapses the distinction between justified acceptability and actual acceptance; 
that he thereby fails to do justice to the 'epistemic meaning' of his own theory; and that he reduces 
practical reason to instrumental reason by subordinating the political conception to the aim of securing 
stability (RPUR 36-7). Some of these objections are clearly based on misunderstandings.  Be that as it 29
may, it is these objections that prompt Rawls’s remark that the chief difference between his approach and 
Habermas’s is that 'his is comprehensive, while mine is an account of the political and is limited that' (PL 
47). 
 What exactly Rawls means by this remark is hard to discern, because he uses the concept of 
'comprehensive doctrine' in at least three different senses, to mean: a) world views, religious and secular; 
b) actually existing moralities, or conceptions of the good; c) philosophical theories of one kind or 
another, including moral theories such as utilitarianism or Kantianism. Further, all of these three types of 
comprehensive doctrine have one feature in common, which is that they are all subject to reasonable 
doubt, because there are several alternatives that reasonable people might endorse. Consequently, Rawls’s 
counterargument can be developed in at least three different ways. The way Rawls actually goes on to 
develop it in RH shows that the objection to Habermas he has in mind is that Discourse Theory takes too 
many theoretical hostages to fortune – i.e. it is 'comprehensive in sense c) – whilst Rawls’s theory 'leaves 
philosophy as it is' (RH 49-51 & 48). 
  
2.3. Rather than deny the accusation that his theory is 'comprehensive', Habermas defends himself by 
arguing that political theories have to take a stand on some philosophical questions, which, while beyond 
the domain of the political, nevertheless are not 'metaphysical' in any objectionable sense.  Habermas 30
considers his own Discourse Theory to be ‘post-metaphysical’ in the sense that it has been purged of 
extravagant ontological assumptions, that it consists in defeasible hypotheses, that it begins from 
empirical assumptions and relates to empirical inquiry through the reconstructive method.  He takes this 31
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tack presumably because he is cognizant of the fact that his democratic and legal theory in BFN does 
indeed presuppose the truth of Discourse Ethics, and some related aspects of the Theory of 
Communicative Action.  
 There is another reason too. Habermas believes it better to be upfront with his philosophical 
commitments, because he does not think that the philosopher has to respond to the fact of reasonable 
pluralism, that is, to the fact that his theory is open to reasonable doubt, in the same way as the legislator 
and the citizen do. In the political domain reasonable pluralism is a fact, and the default assumption is that 
it will always be so. Hence, for strategic reasons, legislators and citizens had better not saddle their 
political justifications of a coercible law or policy with controversial assumptions. But the same does not 
hold for the political philosopher. In the realm of political theory, Habermas assumes, the unforced force 
of the better argument will eventually prevail, and consequently his theory will either prove itself or be 
overturned.  In which case, Habermas thinks, there is no reason to claim, as Rawls does, that the 32
'citizens, not the philosophers, are to have the final word' on the truth or correctness of a political theory 
(RTMW 108). That would only be a relevant consideration if the task of political theorist was to draw up 
a blueprint of the good society in the manner of Fichte or Fourier. But by Habermas’s lights political 
philosophy has long since given up the illusion that its task is to work out matters of substance like that. 
So it is not a worry for a 'post-metaphysical' theory that confines itself to the task of 'clarifying the 
implications of the legal institutionalization of procedures of democratic legislation' (RTMW 108). The 
work of the political philosopher in the theoretical domain, the work of explication, clarification and 
rational reconstruction, is distinct from the democratic deliberation of citizens in the political domain, or 
as Habermas puts it, in the formal public sphere, and it matters not, if the theorist makes use of ideas that 
are not political values and ideas in Rawls’ narrow sense set out in 1.6 above. 
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2.4. Is this a good response? Yes and No. Habermas is right to claim that controversial theoretical 
commitments do not present the same kind of problem to the philosopher as the religious or otherwise 
doctrinaire commitments of a reasonable citizen of liberal constitutional democratic state engaging in 
political justification in the context of reasonable pluralism. And the onus here is surely on Rawls to show 
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that political theories must answer to the same constraints as first order political discourses of 
justification. That said, theoretical hostages to fortune are both philosophically and practically 
unwelcome, since they tend to deflect attention from the main issue. And Habermas has some very hefty 
ones, for example his pragmatic theory of meaning and truth, not to mention his theory of social 
evolution.   33
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2.5. So far the dispute has broached only what look like meta-theoretical questions, questions of how 
political philosophy is best done. Actually the term ‘meta-theoretical’ does not properly capture what is at 
issue, because one of Rawls’s controversial views is that the justification of political theory is itself a 
practical political matter: i.e. it is the work of citizens in providing the reasons they owe to one another, 
and of the state in providing the reasons it owes to its citizens, in order to justify the laws and policies 
with which it demands compliance. But this practice, Rawls claims, the aim of which is to determine the 
legitimacy of a political system (and its basic structure), and to evince stability for the right reasons, is 
impeded when political philosophy reaches for materials beyond the domain of political values (in the 
sense defined in 1.6 above) and makes use of controversial, non-political ideas. So on this view, which 
Habermas denies, meta-theoretical controversies are also practical political ones. 
 That said, there is further dimension to Rawls’s objection to the comprehensiveness of 
Habermas’s theory, which touches upon an even more fundamental issue dividing them, namely the 
relation of morality to legitimate law, and the question of the moral content and status of legitimate law. 
In this case what is at issue is the extent to which, and the way in which, political legitimacy can be 
'freestanding' from morality. This is a significant area of dispute. However, the point at issue is hard to pin 
down because the relation between morality and law in Habermas’s theory is complex and somewhat 
diffuse. 
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2.6. Habermas’s main argument in Between Facts and Norms is that principle (D) assumes 'the shape 
of a principle of democracy only by way of legal institutionalization' which is to say, the principle of 
democracy, Habermas claims, 'derives from the interpenetration of principle (D) and the legal form.'  As 34
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we saw above, the principle of democracy is supposed to rationally reconstruct 'the democratic procedure 
for the production of law' which in turn is the sole source of legitimacy.  (Recall Habermas rejects the 35
Kantian and the Natural Law view according to which the laws borrow their legitimacy from the authority 
of morality. ) 36
 To understand Habermas’s theory here we need to know more about what he means by the legal 
form.  Legitimate laws are: 37
a. properly enacted according to a legally constituted process;  
b. coercible by force that is itself legitimate. (These features of the form of law give citizens two 
different but conjoined reasons for complying with the law: namely that it is indeed the law, and that 
violation of the law lead to sanctions of some kind. Habermas thinks of these as the positivity of 
law.) But there is more to law than that. Legitimate laws have in addition  
c. an extra-legal rationale.  
This rationale consists in the various reasons and kinds of reasons — moral, ethical and pragmatic — why 
the law was made, and remains on the statutes. This rationale is essential to the law’s legitimacy. It is 
because the decisions of the political system (parliaments or assemblies) are sensitive to the input of 
moral, ethical and pragmatic reasons that flow into the democratic-decision making body from 'civil 
society' – Habermas’s term for the informal public sphere in which discourse flows freely, and in which 
citizens form their political opinions and will – that their outputs (laws and policies) in turn have a 
rationale that resonates with the background beliefs of the citizens and elicits widespread quasi-voluntary 
compliance.  It is this feature of law that attunes it to the private autonomy of citizens, by allowing them 38
to act lawfully out of insight into its rationale, rather than out of sheer obedience to the fact that it is the 
law, or out of fear of sanctions they will meet if they break the law. 
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2.6 The point I want to focus on is that this rationale of legitimate law is made up in part by reasons of 
morality.  Although he allows that ethical reasons – reasons that have to do with conceptions of the good 39
life and associated values – and pragmatic reasons play a role in politics, he is clear that moral reasons 
have priority.  Ethical reasons only have validity (and thus can play a role in the determination of the 40
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legitimacy of law) within the bounds of moral permissibility. In this sense there is, what he calls, an 
'absolute priority of the right over the good' and note that by 'the right' here, he means moral rightness.  41
Note also that this priority does not just hold in the political domain. The priority of the right (of valid 
moral norms) is not something that only applies to laws which people may be forced to comply with. It is 
not a constraint that operates just within the political domain by dint of the fact that reasonable citizens 
are profoundly divided by their religious, ethical and metaphysical world views, and yet must all abide by 
the same laws. Rather it applies outwith the political domain of legitimate law, in its recesses, in civil 
society at large, and in the moral realm more broadly. In other words the public reasons that are 
channelled from civil society into the law making procedure come already stamped with the priority of 
moral rightness, and the resulting laws bear the hallmarks of this input (alongside whatever features they 
get from the form of law itself) as features of their legitimacy.  
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2.7. All this leads Habermas to endorse a thesis, the full significance of which, I believe, has yet to be 
appreciated. I shall call it: the moral permissibility constraint or MPC for short. Habermas often observes 
that legitimate laws must 'harmonize with the universal principles of justice and solidarity'.  He also says 42
that 'a legal order can be legitimate only if it does not contradict basic moral principles.'  43
 Actually, there appear to be two claims here, a requirement of coherence, and a prohibition on 
inconsistency. The former is stronger than the latter, and sits well with Habermas’s functional account 
whereby public reasons from arenas of discourse in civil society are let in to the political system by 
various sluices and channels, which suggests that the claim is about the moral content of law. (The 
stronger claim is also implied by Habermas’s criticism that Rawls’s idea of a political conception lacks 
'deontological meaning', insofar as it is based only on a serendipitous overlapping consensus, for that 
criticism suggests that by contrast Habermas’s conception of legitimacy better captures the 'deontological 
meaning' of legitimate law.) However, understood as a coherence requirement MPC would seem to be 
much too strong, because there are too many legitimate laws – for example those governing which side of 
the road citizens should drive on – which are morally speaking neither here nor there. In such cases, 
unlike say laws prohibiting murder or theft, coherence with morality is not in question. Hence we should 
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interpret MPC negatively as being about mere consistency of law with morality: MPC impugns the 
legitimacy of any law that violates a valid moral norm. Recall that on Habermas’s view legitimate laws 
elicit quasi-voluntary compliance, and enable the exercise of autonomy, but once set against morality laws 
cannot do either of these things. Laws that are not consistent with the demands of morality give rise to 
'cognitive dissonance'  and practical dilemmas (BFN 99, 350). 
 To be clear, MPC is not a just a theoretical requirement, and certainly not a requirement that moral 
philosophy’s demands be satisfied by law. Rather it is a multi-dimensional requirement of consistency 
that has to be met within the entire system of legislation, adjudication and administration. This is because 
modern societies are complex and functionally differentiated entities in which the political system is 'just 
one action system among others' which has to be able 'to communicate through the medium of law with 
all the other legitimately ordered spheres of action' (BFN 302).  44
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2.8. Now, in addition to the direct constraint of moral permissibility, that no legitimate law may violate 
any valid moral norm, Habermas states that legitimate law 'must also harmonize with...ethical principles.' 
This is actually quite an eye-popping claim for him to make. Habermas is a pluralist about conceptions of 
the good. Obviously this ethical harmonization requirement cannot imply that if someone’s – or some 
group’s – ethical self-understanding conflicts with any law, then that law is not legitimate. That would 
make legitimacy a very scarce resource, almost impossible to achieve.  
 Moreover, Habermas explicitly equates conceptions of the good with religious and metaphysical 
world views, so such a move would be incompatible with his methodological presupposition that his 
theory conforms to the precepts of post-metaphysical thinking. So Habermas would be more or less 
contradicting himself if he held democratic legitimacy to be dependent on any particular ethical 
conception or values. In this case, I believe that what Habermas must mean, and what we should take him 
to be saying, is just that legitimate laws should aspire to garner as much support from ethical values as 
possible. True, this raises tricky question about whose ethics the legislators should reach out to, and 
whose not, and raises worries about the tyranny of the majority culture. In BFN Habermas does not go 
into much detail about the role of ethical reasons in the determination of legitimate law. However some of 
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the more obvious worries are allayed by the fact that he subscribes to the priority of the right, which in his 
view implies that all ethical conceptions and all ethical reasons are already operative within the bounds of 
moral permissibility.  Clearly then, whatever role they play in the determination of legitimate law, ethical 45
reasons are subject to the absolute priority of morality. Recall that Habermas is not a pluralist about 
morality: he is an unabashed universalist: there is no scope restriction on the moral principle (or on the 
moral norms it validates), and the fact of pluralism (reasonable or not) in his view does not apply to 
morality. Even so, he holds that Discourse Ethics, along with its central principle (U), meets all the 
criteria for a post-metaphysical theory, which means that MPC is still in tune with his methodological 
self-understanding. 
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2.9. With MPC Habermas claims it is a necessary condition of any legitimate law that it not violate any 
valid moral norm. Habermas does not claim that moral permissibility is sufficient for legitimacy, in fact 
he denies this.  He sums up his position – presumably referring to the priority of moral rightness, and the 46
MPC: 'law owes its legitimacy in essence to its moral contents'.   47
 Now one advantage of building this feature into his procedural account of democratic legitimacy, is 
that it explains not only why citizens are guaranteed to be treated as free and equal by law, but also why 
they are (and should be) protected from certain kinds of moral harm or injury.  But at the same time it 48
raises some very tricky questions for Habermas’s overall theory. 
 First, how does it square with Habermas’s insistence that the political stands free from the moral? 
Habermas appears to think that such a question does not arise because (D) 'remains neutral with respect to 
morality and law' and because the principle of democracy is supposed to be derived from (D), together 
with the form of law. (This is the basis of his critique of Karl-Otto Apel, Kant and Natural Law. ) 49
However, if it is a requirement (whether social, functional, theoretical, or all three) that legitimate law not 
violate any valid moral norm, then democratic legitimacy is subordinate to morality, in the sense that 
moral requirements set a parameter of the production of legitimate law. This holds regardless of how 
things stand with theoretical (reconstructive) relations between (D), the form of law, the principle of 
Democracy, and what Habermas calls the 'logical genesis of rights.'   
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 It seems to me that MPC and the priority of moral rightness, as Habermas understands them, 
smudges the sharp line that Habermas wishes to draw between the domain of legitimate law (and the 
supposedly sui generis sources of its authority) and the normativity of morality. In short, if Habermas is 
serious about the MPC, and the priority of the right, as he understands these, then he must accept that the 
political system in its production of legitimate law does not stand free from morality. Rather, regardless of 
the relation that is supposed to hold between the principle of democracy, and principle (D), the moral 
principle (U) - that is, moral discourse and its outputs - namely all valid moral norms - constrain 
democratic legitimacy from within and without. To my mind this is the most important respect in which 
Habermas’s theory is, in the final analysis, just as Rawls claims it to be, comprehensive. Yet this was not 
the way in Rawls understood and developed his objection in the debate with Habermas, focused as he 
was, largely on meta-theoretical and methodological differences. So this very significant issue was not 
addressed. 
  
2.10.  Habermas’s only recourse here would be to argue that the Discourse Theory of Law and the 
conception of democratic legitimacy he puts forward in BFN is freestanding in the sense that it is not 
dependent on any comprehensive moral doctrine or comprehensive morality, even if, as he admits, 'law 
owes its legitimacy in essence to its moral contents'. Many of Habermas’s defenders seem to think that 
such an argument can be made. I envisage three possible lines of defence. 
!
a) The first is the one we have already discussed, namely the contention that in Discourse Ethics not a 
comprehensive moral doctrine because it is a post-metaphysical theory. But as we saw in 2.3 above, that 
means only that Habermas’s theory abstains from making certain kinds of metaphysical and ontological 
claims, that his theory is defeasible, and proceeds from empirically assumptions by way of the 
reconstructive method. None of that shows that it is not a 'comprehensive moral doctrine' in any of the 
relevant senses, namely a), b) and c) above. On the contrary it is a controversial theory that is open to 
reasonable doubt by reasonable people. That theory, as we have seen Larmore charge, presupposes the 
truth of a secular world view, by advancing a general theory about the obsolescence of religious and 
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metaphysical narratives. Moreover, it is not scope restricted: it is a universal theory that applies across all 
domains. It does make use of ideas and theories that lie beyond the domain of political values as Rawls 
sees it, and hence fails to meet the publicity condition. 
!
b) The second possible defence of Habermas is that Discourse Ethics not a comprehensive moral 
doctrine because is procedural and not substantive. Against this, it can be and has been argued – to my 
mind, convincingly – that Habermas smuggles a lot of moral substance into the procedures he 
reconstructs, both in principle (D) and in the pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation. However, since 
this line of argument has been well developed by others, I shall not pursue it here.  A more direct 50
response is to say that, whether or not Discourse Ethics is procedural (in Habermas’s sense) is beside the 
point. Habermas contends that no legitimate law may contradict 'moral principles' and the plural indicates 
that he is referring to valid moral norms, rather than principle (U). It is true that Habermas’s theory 
prescinds (allegedly) from stating what valid moral norms there are. The discourse theory of morality is 
procedural, Habermas claims, in that it leaves the determination of moral norms to participants 
themselves in actual discourses. It is not substantive in the sense that it does not offer a repertoire of 
norms and values. That said, Habermas does think that there are some valid moral norms.  He is not an 51
error theorist; he is a success theorist: he holds that some candidate moral norms successfully pass the test 
of universalization contained in principle (U). Habermas’s position is that whatever moral principles there 
are, and there are some, no legitimate law may contradict them.  
 What needs to be shown, if this line of defence is to be successful, is that by virtue of being 
procedural (in Habermas’s sense) the discourse theory of morality is therefore not a 'comprehensive moral 
doctrine' in Rawls’s sense. Rawls, as we have seen, uses the term ‘comprehensive doctrine’ in contrast to 
political conception. Political conceptions are scope restricted and open to justification by public reason 
alone.  Discourse Ethics, though, is not scope restricted.  Principle (U) and the norms that it validates are 
universal and apply to actions in all domains. So Discourse Ethics is a comprehensive moral doctrine in 
the sense that it is not tailored only or primarily to the basic structure. 
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 Political conceptions, according to Rawls, have also to meet the publicity condition. Now on 
Habermas’s account it looks like valid moral norms will meet the publicity condition. That follows 
already from their being universally valid. (Note that Rawls abstains on this point, because he, unlike 
Habermas, allows that reasonable people may disagree about morality and moral theory, and about which 
moral norms are universally valid.) What counts for Rawls is that a moral norm should also be a political 
value, i.e. it should form part of an overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines, and in addition, it 
should be the case that all free and equal citizens can be reasonably expected to endorse it as a political 
value. The difference here is small, but important. For Habermas the acceptability (and acceptance/
acceptedness) of valid moral norms is carried over intact from the moral domain into the political and 
legal sphere, and holds both within and without. So insofar as moral norms – on Habermas’s account of 
morality – meet the publicity condition, they do so in the wrong way, so far as Rawls is concerned – they 
meet it qua universally valid moral norms – and in that sense Discourse Ethics is a comprehensive moral 
doctrine in sense b) above. For Rawls, by contrast, in the political domain all bets are off: all political 
values, whether moral or not, have to win their reasonable acceptance anew, as political values, in the 
political sphere from free and equal citizens.  
  
c) Finally, it might be argued that in the process of its Verschränkung (interpenetration) with the form 
of law, somehow the comprehensive elements of morality are screened out, so that one is left with only 
something like what Lon Fuller called the 'inner morality of law.'  The objection rests entirely on the 52
aptness of Fuller’s phrase (the 'inner morality of law') to capture the normative feature of that Habermas is 
after with MPC. However, Fuller’s idea is quite different. For one thing, what Habermas understands by 
'moral principles' and 'valid moral norms,' and thus by the MPC, is something very different to what 
Fuller means by the 'inner morality of law.' What Fuller has in mind is that laws take the form of rules, 
that these are clear and coherent, that they are promulgated, that they are not made retrospectively etc.  53
Most of what Fuller calls 'the inner morality of law' is in fact captured in Habermas by what he calls ‘the 
form of law’ and by the requirement of the principle of democracy that laws be properly enacted 
according to a legally recognized process. It is certainly not the case, on the account Habermas’s gives in 
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BFN, that in the process of the Verschränkung of principle (D) with the legal form, the universal scope of 
moral norms, is screened out along with the controversial and thus dubitable features of his moral theory. 
So the appeal to Fuller’s theory is not appropriate and cannot be used to save Habermas from the 
objection.  
!
2.11. It turns out, then, that Habermas theory is indeed a 'comprehensive moral and philosophical 
doctrine' in at least senses b) and c), a doctrine of the kind that Rawls believed political theory was to 
avoid. In the end, if Habermas is serious about endorsing MPC and the priority of the right (as he 
construes it, namely as the priority of the moral over the ethical) then he ends up endorsing a position 
very close to the one that he attributes to Apel, Kant, and Natural Law theorists, and which he rejects on 
the grounds that they make the legitimacy of the law depend on the authority of the moral.  
 This does not in itself resolve the debate between Habermas and Rawls in the latter’s favour, 
although it does uncover a deep problem in Habermas’s theory. If Habermas was to prevail, without 
radically altering his own theories, he would need to convince Rawls that Discourse Ethics (or something 
similar) is true, that there are some universally valid moral norms, and that such norms as there are, by 
that fact alone, count as political values. I doubt that Rawls would be minded to concede these points. 
Still, rather than insisting that his own theory is 'morally freestanding' and that the source of legitimacy is 
not borrowed from the moral, Habermas would have been better off pursuing a different line of argument, 
and merely countering that Rawls conceives the boundaries of the political too narrowly and too 
impermeably. Against the charge that his theory was comprehensive in sense c), Habermas, as we saw, 
replied that Rawls has weightier philosophical commitments than he is prepared to admit:  'Political 
theory' as Habermas puts it 'cannot move entirely in the domain of the political and steer clear of …
philosophical controversies.' (MW 93) Habermas could make, and in my view probably should have 
made, a similar argument against the charge that Discourse Theory is comprehensive in sense b): namely 
that the domain of the political and of democratically legitimate law is inevitably entangled in morality, 
understood as the actually existing moral practice that Discourse Ethics claims to reconstruct, and hence 
cannot be freestanding from every 'comprehensive moral doctrine' a Rawls claims.  54
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 The exchange of views took place in Journal of Philosophy, 1995.  Habermas’s reply to Rawls’ ‘Reply” 1
appeared in The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory (Cambridge: Polity, 2005 [1999]), 
75-104; and was also republished in Finlayson and Freyenhagen eds. (2010), 92-117. See note 4 below.
 An anonymous referee for this journal has claimed that one should not assume that two such important 2
thinkers failed to understand one another. But that is the consensus view in the literature. It is most 
trenchantly expressed by Christopher McMahon, (2002). It was the near unanimous view of a panel of 
Cambridge political philosophers including Onora O’Neill and Andrew Kuper. Skinner et. al. (2002). 
Joseph Heath in a recent article remarks on the 'relatively low level of philosophical engagement between 
the two thinkers' and A. S. Laden has claimed that Rawls and Habermas 'end up talking past one another'.  
Heath (2011), 117 and Laden (2011), 135. Jonathan Wolf (2008) described the debate as 'an exchange that 
other readers have felt to be a somewhat embarrassing failure of two of the greatest contemporary minds 
to meet.' Habermas has also been frank enough to acknowledge that he did not initially grasp the 'true 
significance' of Political Liberalism. Habermas, (2011) 284. 
 Rawls claims that there are two main differences between him and Habermas. The first is the role of 3
their respective 'devices of representation.' The second and 'more fundamental difference' is that 
Habermas’s position is comprehensive and his is not. PL, 132.
 In this paper I use the following abbreviations. Habermas: RPUR - 'Reconciliation Through the Public 4
Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism'; RTMW - ‘"Reasonable" versus “True”. 
Or the Morality of Worldviews’; BFN - Between Facts and Norms; TIO - The Inclusion of the Other; JA 
- Justification and Application. Rawls: TJ - Theory of Justice; PL - Political Liberalism; RH - 'Reply to 
Habermas.'
 See for example MCCA, 122. Kohlberg (1981), 197. Kohlberg was not alone in interpreting Rawls’s 5
Justice as Fairness as general theory of right conduct. Michael Sandel also did. See Sandel (1982), 1-15, 
54, 64, 175-83.
 Take for example the following passage: 'The original position may be viewed, then, as a procedural 6
interpretation of Kant’s conception of autonomy and the categorical imperative.' TJ 256.
 Habermas not only construes Theory as a doctrine of justice general in scope, he takes ‘justice’ to be equivalent 7
with moral rightness. (See Finlayson and Freyehagen eds. (2011), 4.) This shows that he, like Kohlberg, takes 
Theory to contain a general moral theory.
 See for example MCCA, 180: 'This moral point of view comes about when the social world is moralized 8
from the hypothetical attitude of  a participant in argumentation…This deontological abstraction separates 
out issues of justice from issues of the good life.' See also MCCA, xii, 200; TIO 28f; and especially, 
Habermas (1989-90: 32-52). In Justification and Application, where Habermas introduces the distinction 
between morality and ethics, he notes that Discourse Ethics would be more properly called the discourse 
theory of morality. JA, 2.
 Habermas 1995b and Rawls 1995. Reprinted in Finlayson and Freyenhagen eds. (2011), 25-45 & 46-91.9
 Habermas, (1992) and (1996).10
 This may explain why so much of the literature focused on the contrast between the original position 11
and principle (U). A representative sample of the literature that endorses the interpretation I reject, 
includes McCarthy (1994); J Donald Moon (1995); McMahon, (2002); Skinner et. al. (2002); and 
Nussbaum, (2003), Bankovsky (2012).
 It also might be that Habermas’s focus is at this point still on the general issue of the normative grounds 12
of Rawls’ theory, how it justifies its content.
 BFN, 110/FG, 141. 'The principle of democracy is what then confers legitimating force on the 13
legislative process.' BFN, 121.
 BFN, 122-123. The nature of the alleged ‘interpenetration [Verschränkung]’ and consequent 14
‘derivation’ is unclear to me. It is not a logical derivation but what Habermas calls a 'reconstruction' of a 
'logical genesis of rights'.
 BFN, 107, 127, 458/FG, 138, 161. Note that (D) says that amenability to consensus in (an ideally 15
prosecuted) discourse is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of the validity of any norm. Both (D) 
and the principle of democracy differ from the moral principle (U) which has the logical form of a bi-
conditional and gives the necessary and sufficient conditions of the validity of moral norms. See Konrad 
Ott (1996), and especially Lumer (1997).
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 MCCA 66.16
 Habermas writes, 'I understand 'action norms' as temporally, socially and substantively generalized 17
behavioural expectations.' BFN, 107.
 BFN, 107, 121.18
 BNR, 80.19
 Habermas, BFN, 448. ‘Legitimacy’ for Habermas is a technical term applying to the social acceptability 20
of law and policy, and the grounds of that social acceptability.
 Habermas, BFN, 103-105 & 104-5; BNR, 78.21
 BFN 297.22
 See, for example, PL, xx-ii, xxixf, xliiif, xlvif, 10-5, 154-8.23
 See Dreben (2003); Talisse (2001); Laden (2011); Langvatn (2013).24
 In TJ, depending on how it was interpreted, it formed a premise of the argument for Justice as Fairness, 25
or it was a heuristic device used to highlight the kinds of reasons supporting Rawls’s two Principles of 
Justice.
 On this see Scanlon (2003).26
 Refer to note 9 above for a sample of literature by commentators hold the position I am arguing against.27
 Fabian Freyenhagen and I  have argued for this in Finlayson and Freyenhagen (eds.) (2011). 28
 For example Habermas assumes that Rawls is indifferent to the truth of Political Liberalism, and is 29
advancing a non-cognitivist theory that does not aspire to truth, whereas Rawls is rather making his 
theory prescind from taking a stance on such sideways-on questions. Habermas also mistakenly thinks 
that the justification of the political conception being offered in PL is the merely instrumental one that it is 
the best means of securing stability (RPUR 36).
 Rawls’s original article on which chapter 1 of Political Liberalism was based was called 'Political, not 30
Metaphysical.' Rawls (1985).
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 See Habermas PT. See also Yates (2011). Habermas’s term 'post-metaphysical' is, as Lorenz B. Puntel 31
has argued, used not with the implication that his theory eschews 'everything that has been called 
metaphysics' but that it avoids the mistakes of what Habermas calls 'metaphysics'. These include the 
priority of the one over the many; first philosophy; foundationalist epistemology. But the most important 
implication of this methodological self-understanding for Habermas’s political theory is that, as Charles 
Larmore nicely put it:  'The normative foundations of the modern liberal-democratic state must consist in 
procedural principles of  justice that do not presuppose the validity of controversial ideas of the good life.' 
Larmore (1995) 59. 
 Note that this is the major point of disagreement between Habermas and Larmore.  The salient feature 32
of our experience as moderns, Larmore argues, 'does not lie in the demise of metaphysical and religious 
worldviews’ but in our acknowledgement 'that reasonable disagreement about the nature of the good life 
and even about the philosophical foundations of morality is not a passing phenomenon, but rather is the 
situation we should expect.' Larmore (1995) 63.
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 Joseph Heath argues that Habermas might more profitably have pursued a different line of defence: 33
namely that, as ‘weakly transcendental,’ Discourse Theory also counts as ‘political’ in Rawls’s sense c). 
Heath argues thus because he, along with Rainer Forst, thinks (D) to be platitudinous, in that it claims 
little more than that norms must be justifiable. (Heath, 2011; Forst, 1999.) That is indeed a possible line 
of defence, but I think Habermas was wise not to take it. Not because of his wider views about the 
relation of political theory to politics proper, but because one of the hallmarks of a 'comprehensive 
doctrine' as Rawls understands it is that a reasonable person can doubt it. And a reasonable person might 
doubt, for example, that (D) is a platitude, especially given its putative role as a premise of the derivation 
of the much more weighty moral principle (U). They might suspect, as Charles Larmore and Seyla 
Benhabib do, that (D) itself either is a moral principle, or rests on antecedent moral principles. (See 
Larmore, 1995, 66-7, and Benhabib, 1990, 345.) Or they might doubt that it is a correct reconstruction of 
what it means to justify a norm. Or they might doubt that the democratic principle follows from the 
interpenetration of (D) and the form of law. All this is eminently dubitable even by reasonable people. But 
if so, this would render Habermas’s theory a moral or philosophical doctrine 'comprehensive' in senses b) 
and or c).
 BFN,122-123.34
 BFN, 448.35
 BFN, 65, 84, 87, 98 448-49.36
 Finlayson and Freyenhagen offer a more detailed analysis of what Habermas means by 'the legal form’ 37
in Finlayson and Freyenhagen (eds.) (2011), 10.
 BFN, 108ff. A little further on Habermas claims that the Democratic Principle presupposes the 38
possibility of 'all the various kinds of justification operative in discourses (and procedurally regulated 
transactions) to which laws owe their legitimacy'. BFN, 110 translation amended/FG, 142. 
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 Habermas argues that 'matters in need of legal regulation certainly do not raise moral questions only, 39
but also involve empirical, pragmatic and ethical aspects as well as issues concerned with the fair 
balancing of interests open to compromise…Unlike the clearly focused normative validity claim of moral 
commands, the legitimacy claim of legal norms, like the legislative practice of justification itself, is 
supported by different types of reasons.' BFN, 99-109, 452; TIO, 257.
 Habermas, BFN, 103, 108 & 113; FG, 64-66; 1993: 13; TIO, 42-3.40
 Indeed when Habermas insists on the priority of the right over the good in his work up to and including 41
Between Facts and Norms he means the priority of questions of justice (which, you will recall, he takes to 
be equivalent with moral rightness) over questions of the good life, the priority of moral norms over 
ethical values. See, for example, TIO 27-8. Habermas talks of the 'conceptual priority of the right over the 
good.' BNR 286. And he makes claims like the following: 'The perspective of justice and that of 
evaluating one’s own life are not equally valid in the sense that the morally required priority of 
impartiality can be levelled out and reversed in favour of the ethical priority of one’s particular goals in 
life.' BNR 287
 Habermas, BFN 99, 155.42
 I take it that by 'moral principles [moralischen Grundsätzen]' Habermas means in the first instance valid 43
moral norms. FG 137/BFN106. Later on, he makes an equivalent claim i.e., that 'legal norms…claim to 
be in accord with moral norms [Moralnormen], that is, not to violate them.' FG 193/BFN 155.
 One anonymous reviewer for this journal suggested that this answers my objection since it shows that 44
the work of ensuring consistency with morality is not that of citizens or philosophers. But that was not the 
worry. The worry was that MPC brings Habermas’s position much closer to the 'morality first' accounts of 
democratic legitimacy which he rejects, and of which he claims Discourse Theory is not one. And that 
worry holds whether or not MPC is a functional requirement of the political and legal system as a whole.
 Habermas goes on to address some of the less obvious worries in his later work on the role of religious 45
reasons. Discussion of such questions would take us too far afield. Some of the most important work is 
contained in Calhoun, Mendieta and Van Antwerpen (eds.) (2013).
 Habermas, BFN 111, 452, 453, & 457.46
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 Habermas, BNR 279.47
 I take it that MPC answers the Dworkinian objection to Habermas’s theory levelled by John Mahoney 48
(2001).
 BFN 80, 89. 49
 McCarthy (1993); Larmore (1995) and more recently Gledhill (2011). 50
 JA 90-92.51
 Fuller (1969) 42.52
 Fuller, (1969) 39.53
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